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Felon Disfranchisement in Missouri: 1821–
1970
Pippa Holloway*

ABSTRACT
In Missouri, individuals who have committed a felony offense cannot vote
until they have completed their prison sentence and any probation or parole.
There are areas of both continuity and change over the two centuries since
Missouri’s first constitution allowed the legislature to limit the suffrage rights
of those convicted of infamous crimes. In pre-Civil War Missouri, the concept
of infamy was a part of legal culture, as was the case in other states. Infamy
connected the degradation of criminal activity and criminal punishment with
the loss of citizenship rights and thus provided the intellectual foundation for
felon disfranchisement. In the half decade after the Civil War, disfranchisement laws were used to target African American voters in most former slave
states to achieve partisan and racial ends, and there is some evidence that this
was the case in Missouri also. These laws continue to disproportionately affect
African American voters in the present day. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, questions of pardon, parole, and restoration of rights played
a key role in shaping the popular and legal understanding of felon disfranchisement. Today, there is no constitutional requirement to extend disfranchisement through probation and parole, and many other states have recently
changed their laws so that voting rights are restored after release from incarceration.
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and guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
Under current Missouri law, individuals who have committed a felony
offense cannot vote until they have completed their prison sentence and any
probation or parole.1 Individuals convicted of election-related offenses are permanently barred from voting.2 As a result of these restrictions, approximately
.5% of the eligible population of Missouri cannot vote due to a criminal conviction.3
The present legal landscape is the product of a long historical legacy. Over
the course of almost two centuries, laws and policies governing the voting
rights of ex-offenders in Missouri have changed in response to political, social,
and legal developments. In other respects, much has remained the same. The
relevant constitutional provisions enabling disfranchisement as a punishment
for crime have changed little over two centuries. As it was at statehood, Missouri’s current constitutional provision is not self-executing. The constitution
states, “Persons convicted of felony, or crime connected with the exercise of
the right of suffrage may be excluded by law from voting.”4 This provision
empowers the legislature to exclude convicted felons from suffrage but gives
the legislative body much discretion in doing so.
Today, as at the time of statehood, Missouri residents who are incarcerated but otherwise eligible to vote are barred from suffrage, but disfranchisement extends beyond incarceration for many.5 Missouri is one of eighteen
states that extends disfranchisement through probation and parole, restoring
rights to ex-felons only after they have completed court supervision.6 While
being freed from incarceration to rejoin society might be understood to be an
indication that one’s punishment has ended and one’s rights of citizenship have
been restored, continuing disfranchisement through probation and parole suggests that ex-felons remain tainted even when no longer incarcerated. Missourians in earlier periods weighed the question of how long disfranchisement
should extend after incarceration, and the state has seen several different
schemes for disfranchisement and subsequent restoration of citizenship rights
throughout its history.7

1. MO. Rev. Stat. § 115.133 (2018).
2. MO. Rev. Stat. §§ 115.133; 115.631 (2018).
3. Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Fel-

ony Disenfranchisement, 2016, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [perma.cc/97VK-FK77].
4. MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
5. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 14.
6. Uggen et al., supra note 3.
7. See infra Part IV. Probation and parole did not become widely implemented
until the late 19th century, so the capacity of those on probation and parole to vote was
not a question in the early days of Missouri statehood. See generally CAROLYN
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The disproportionate impact of these laws on African Americans today
also has historical antecedents. African Americans in Missouri are more likely
than white voters to be disfranchised, with 5.8% of eligible African Americans
in the state ineligible to vote due to a criminal conviction compared to 1.9% of
the total population.8 In the post-Civil War era, these laws were used to perpetuate racial hierarchies.9 White leaders in most states that had practiced racial slavery used and modified existing laws that disfranchised for crime to
target African American voters, denying black men the right to political participation they had won with the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.10
This Article examines the enactment and enforcement of laws disfranchising for criminal convictions during three periods of Missouri history. For
each period, Missouri’s history is contrasted to developments in other states.
Regional comparisons between so-called “slave” and “free-states” – those that
maintained a system of racial slavery until the end of the Civil War and those
that eliminated it much earlier – are also made. Each section also offers an
overview of the national and regional landscape of these laws during the relevant period. This Article begins with an examination of pre-Civil War Missouri law and an exploration of the concept of legal infamy. Infamy is a complicated and shifting concept, but it connected the degradation of criminal activity and criminal punishment to the loss of the right to vote.11 Part III examines the Reconstruction era through the late Nineteenth century, a period where
these laws were used to target African American voters in most former slave
states. Part IV encompasses the early to mid-Twentieth century. In this period,
questions of pardon, parole, and restoration of rights played a key role in shaping the popular and legal understanding of felon disfranchisement. This Article
concludes with a discussion of the implications of this historical legacy for the
present.

I. STATEHOOD TO THE CIVIL WAR: INFAMY
Laws denying rights and privileges of citizenship to individuals convicted
of certain criminal acts have long existed in the western world. In fact, such
practices date back to ancient Greece and Rome and have antecedents in early
modern European law as well as in English common law.12 The practice of
punishing serious crimes with denial of the vote migrated from Europe to the

STRANGE, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: PARDON IN NEW YORK FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE DEPRESSION (2016).
8. Uggen et al., supra note 3.
9. PIPPA HOLLOWAY, LIVING IN INFAMY: FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 31–32 (2014).
10. Id. at 33–53.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 17–32.
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new American republic, and by the 1830s, most states had laws disfranchising
people convicted of major crimes.13

A. Missouri Law in the Early Decades of Statehood
In advance of becoming a state in 1821, the U.S. Congress authorized
Missouri residents to write a constitution.14 Among the provisions of the Missouri Constitution of 1820 was, “The general assembly shall have the power to
exclude from every office of honor, trust, or profit, within this state, and from
the right of suffrage, all persons convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime.”15 This authorized the newly-created General Assembly to pass
legislation restricting voting by people with certain kinds of criminal convictions.
The legislature soon acted in accordance with this authority. The first
criminal statutes passed by the legislature, part of the 1825 code, punished a
variety of crimes with disqualification from holding office, testifying in court,
and serving on a jury, in addition to the standard criminal penalties of fines,
imprisonment, and/or whipping.16 This suggests the legislature interpreted “office of honor, trust, or profit” broadly to include not only elected office but also
serving on a jury or as a witness in court. Those convicted of stealing a slave,17
stealing a horse, mare, gelding, mule, or ass,18 counterfeiting or forgery,19 or
perjury lost all four of these privileges.20 Individuals who bribed public officials or bought or sold public offices could not hold office or vote but could
testify and serve as jurors.21 Individuals convicted of bigamy were rendered
infamous – the only mention of “infamy” in the statute – and could not hold
office or testify.22 Individuals who received bribes for voting could no longer
vote;23 jurors who took bribes could no longer serve as jurors. 24
The 1825 statutes appear to have been a work in progress – at least with
regard to infamous punishments – since the 1835 criminal code offered a
broader and more consistent definition of infamy.25 Under the 1835 code, one

Id.
Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 16th Cong. (1820).
MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 14.
1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF MO. §§ 1–102 (1825) [hereinafter 1825 CODE] (repealed 1836).
17. 1825 CODE § 32.
18. 1825 CODE § 34.
19. 1825 CODE §§ 42–48, 50–51.
20. 1825 CODE § 56.
21. 1825 CODE §§ 59, 62.
22. 1825 CODE § 76.
23. 1825 CODE § 86.
24. 1825 CODE § 64.
25. Compare 1825 CODE §§ 1–102 with REVISED STATS. OF MO., art. VIII (1835)
[hereinafter REVISED STATS. OF 1835].
13.
14.
15.
16.
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became infamous in Missouri by committing an infamous crime, including
“every offense for which the offender, on conviction or sentence, is declared
to be disqualified or rendered incompetent to be a witness or juror, or to vote
at any election, or to hold any office of honor, profit or trust.”26 In short, infamous crimes were those that resulted in infamous punishment. The criminal
code iterated which crimes brought about these infamous punishments; these
were thus defined as infamous crimes.27 While this statute might at first glance
seem to offer a circular definition, this was in fact a classical articulation of
infamy. One could become infamous because certain punishments were degrading and thus lowered the social status of those who received them.28 Losing the right to vote, which reduced one’s function as a person of honor and
impeded one’s role as a citizen, brought about degradation. The legal term for
that degradation was “infamy.”29
This statutory definition of infamy was in line with developments in
American law in this era, which some viewed as more democratic than English
common law. In 1836, the Vermont Supreme Court pointed out that allowing
courts to determine what was infamous was “consistent with the principles of
the English oligarchy,” but not befitting a democracy.30 In America, “it would
seem to belong to the legislature to decide what crimes should be considered
infamous.”31
The criminal statutes enacted by the Missouri legislature in 1835 offered
a list of infamous crimes that was much more extensive than the 1825 code.32
Infamous, disfranchising crimes included crimes against the state such as treason, rebellion, and insurrection.33 Many violent crimes were infamous, including first degree murder, rape, and manslaughter, but not lesser degrees of these
crimes, some of which were also felonies.34 Infamous punishments were given
to those convicted of a whole list of felony- and misdemeanor-grade sex
crimes, including rape, compelling marriage, and enticing to prostitution, as

26. REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. VIII, § 37. For commentary on this statutory
article, see Barrett v. Sartorius, 175 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1943) (en banc).
27. See, e.g., REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. VIII, § 62 (stating, “Every person who
shall be convicted of arson burglary robbery or larceny in any degree in this Art. specified or who shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for any other crime
punishable under the provisions of this Art. shall be incompetent to be sworn as a witness or serve as a juror in any cause and shall be forever disqualified from voting at any
election or holding any office of honor trust or profit within this state.”).
28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769, at 372 (1979).
29. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of infamy and its 19th century
connection to disfranchisement in the US, see HOLLOWAY, supra note 10, at 1–53.
30. State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 60 (Vt. 1836).
31. Id.
32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33. REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. I, §§ 1–10.
34. Id. at art. II, §§ 1–22, 42.
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well as sexual and violent crimes against children.35 Individuals convicted of
arson, burglary, robbery, or larceny – in any degree – were infamous, but counterfeiting was only infamous if it was at the felony level.36 All degrees of perjury were infamous, but other felony grade offenses against justice, such as
bribing witnesses or accepting a bribe as a juror, were not disfranchising.37
Abortion was not infamous, whether it was a misdemeanor or felony.38 Missouri’s 1835 statutory definition of infamous crimes remained relatively unchanged throughout the 19th century and included most felonies and some misdemeanors.39 One exception was treason.40 Treason resulted in infamous punishments in the pre-Civil War code, but by 1879, this punishment had been
rescinded.41
This understanding of infamy as being produced by the punishment, specifically the degrading punishments of disfranchisement and disqualification,
can be seen elsewhere in Missouri statutes. For example, under an 1879 law,
one could be legally charged with slandering a woman by accusing her of engaging in a variety of sexual offenses or acts, or “any felony, the commission
of which would subject such person to disfranchisement and other degrading
penalties.”42 Additionally, suggesting that a woman committed a crime that
would have lost her the right to vote or hold office, such as cutting off someone’s ear, was slander.43 In short, suggesting that a woman had been degraded
by being subjected to infamous punishments was slanderous. But accusing a
woman of committing a crime that did not bring about these punishments, for
example poisoning or performing an abortion, was not slander under state
law.44 This was true even though women could not legally vote or hold office
in Missouri in this period. Slander could only occur if one accused someone
of an infamous, degrading offense.45
Missouri law aligned loosely with common law traditions. Infamous
crimes under common law were those that reflected immorality and deceit,
even if they were misdemeanors. Immorality could include crimes such as

Id. at art. II, §§ 25–27, 40–42.
Id. at art. III, §§ 1–35, 62.
Id. at art. V, §§ 1–44.
Id. at art. II, §§ 9–10, 42.
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 3510, 3624, 3715 (1889) (repealed).
MO. REV. STAT. § 1227 (1879) (repealed).
Id.
§ 1590.
§§ 1261, 1282, 1590.
§§ 1266–68, 1282, 1590.
§ 1590; see also Pippa Holloway, “They Are All She Had”: Formerly Incarcerated Women and the Right to Vote, 1890-1945 in CAGING BORDERS AND CARCERAL
STATES: INCARCERATIONS, IMMIGRATION DETENTIONS, AND RESISTANCE 186–210
(Robert T. Chase ed., 2019) (further discussing women and infamous punishments in
the decades before women’s suffrage).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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perjury or treason whereby one disregarded an oath and thus lacked honor.46 It
might also include crimes of sexual immorality, such as bigamy or fornication.47 In a tradition that dated back to English common law but that extended
through the Nineteenth century, American courts considered crimes of deceit,
such as larceny, to be infamous, but crimes of violence, such as murder or assault, generally were not considered infamous.48
This tradition held true in Missouri, where larceny, sex-related crimes,
and arson were infamous at both the felony and misdemeanor level.49 Common
law did not hold violent crimes to be infamous, and in Nineteenth century Missouri, many violent felonies were not infamous, including second-degree assault and murder as well as other kinds of assault, wounding, and maiming.50
For example, those who accidentally killed someone with a weapon in the heat
of passion were guilty of manslaughter, not murder, and thus spared the punishments of disfranchisement and disqualification, an exclusion which again
mirrored common law exclusions for violent crimes.51 In sum, while burglary,
robbery, larceny, and arson at the felony or misdemeanor level were infamous
and therefore disfranchising, not all degrees of murder or manslaughter were.52
Missouri’s slave-era exclusion of crimes specific to African American
people from the list of infamous crimes is further evidence of how legislators
understood infamy to result from the degradation brought by punishment. 53
Enslaved people could not be rendered infamous through criminal penalties
because they were already infamous. For example, sexual assault of a white
woman by an African American man was not infamous and did not have the
penalties of disfranchisement and disqualification affixed to it. While the obvious explanation for this exclusion is that these individuals could not vote or
hold office – so these were not rights that they could lose – understanding infamy offers a more sophisticated explanation. An African American person
convicted of such a crime could not be made infamous as a result of the conviction because she or he was already considered infamous. Prisoners and
slaves occupied the same legal status. Enslaved people were degraded by their
captivity, similar to how individuals punished with infamous punishments were
degraded.54

46. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 420–21 (12th ed.

1866).
47. JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN CASE FOR MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY
110–14 (2015).
48. See e.g., Anderson vs. Winfree, 85 Ky. 597 (Ky. 1887).
49. REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. II, §§ 25–29, 42; art. III § 62.
50. Id. at art. II, § 2.
51. Id. at art. II, §§ 13, 42.
52. Id. at art. II, § 42, art. III, § 62.
53. See, e.g., id. at art. II, §§ 28, 42.
54. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 1–32 (discussing in more detail the infamy of
enslaved African Americans).
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B. National and Regional Comparisons
Missouri law reflected a distinctly southern understanding of infamy that
contrasted with the legal culture in northeastern states in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Political leaders in northeastern states consciously moved away
from the idea that infamy came from punishment and toward the idea that infamy came from committing serious crimes.55 For example, in 1836, the Vermont Supreme Court wrote, “The old notion that infamy depended upon the
nature of the punishment, is long since abandoned.”56 Leaders in southern
states, in contrast, continued to see infamy as a product of the punishment.57
These regional differences had their roots in the institution of slavery.
Maintaining hierarchies whereby members of one segment of the population
were permanently degraded and cast out of citizenship due to their captivity
and subjected to humiliating punishment had long-lasting traction in the South
because the system of punishing convicts this way mirrored the institution of
slavery.58 Though Missouri was a border state, its legal culture was deeply
shaped by the system of racial slavery, and this accounts for Missouri’s alignment with southern states regarding legal understandings of infamy.59
Northeastern states – especially New England states that had shorter histories of racial slavery – were less likely to punish crimes with the infamous
punishments of life-long disfranchisement, bars on office-holding, and disqualification from jury service and testimony.60 New England states, as well as
states in the mid-Atlantic region, were also more likely to debate and reject
provisions disfranchising for crime in this era.61 Delegates to constitutional
conventions in the Northeast evidenced a distinct degree of unease with permanently disfranchising individuals convicted of crimes in the early to midNineteenth century.62 While some northeastern states did disfranchise for
crime, other states in the region rejected such provisions entirely.63 In some
other northeastern states, constitutional conventions limited the impact or extent of these provisions to protect the rights of those with criminal convictions.64

HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 17–32.
State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 64 (Vt. 1836).
HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 1–32.
Id. at 28–30.
See generally KELLY M. KENNINGTON, IN THE SHADOW OF DRED SCOTT: ST.
LOUIS FREEDOM SUITS AND THE LEGAL CULTURE OF SLAVERY IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA (2017); ANNE TWITTY, BEFORE DRED SCOTT: SLAVERY AND LEGAL CULTURE
IN THE AMERICAN CONFLUENCE, 1787–1857 (2016).
60. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 23–31.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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In contrast, southern states uniformly enacted sweeping provisions permanently disfranchising for infamous or major crimes, and there is little evidence of dissent or debate over this punishment in the South. An understanding
of infamy as the product of degrading punishments, a connection between the
degradation of slavery and the degradation of incarceration, and a belief that
the stain of this degradation lasted a lifetime were all characteristics of the legal
culture in slave states.65 Missouri was admitted to the United States as a slave
state, and slavery played a critical role in shaping Missouri’s economic, legal,
and social development.66 Laws and practices in Missouri regarding infamy
and disfranchisement remain one of the legacies of the slave system. The Jim
Crow system, which maintained white political and social power after slavery
ended, would further shape the system of felon disfranchisement in Missouri
into the Twentieth and Twenty-first century.67

II. 1865–1916: DISFRANCHISEMENT TO ACHIEVE RACIAL AND
PARTISAN ENDS
White Missouri residents were deeply divided over secession and war, as
were whites in many border states.68 The Republican party was unusually powerful in Missouri in the war’s immediate aftermath, but as was also the case in
other border states, former secessionists came to dominate state politics by the
1870s.69 Their rise to power coincided with a decline in the percentage of the
state that was African American. In 1821, following the Missouri compromise,
enslaved people made up about 15% of the population, a fraction that would
drop to about 10% in 1860.70 By 1870, a growing white population made African Americans just 7% of the total population of the state.71 Despite the decline in the African American share of the population, white Missourians devoted much effort to maintaining political and social dominance. Denying the
vote to African Americans was an important part of that.
Few changes were made to criminal disfranchisement provisions in southern states in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. At some of the constitutional conventions held in states of the former Confederacy in 1868, Republicans tried, with little success, to insert constitutional provisions limiting disfranchisement as punishment for criminal conviction.72 Proposals in Alabama
Id.
Missouri Compromise, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 22, § 8 (1820).
See infra Part III.
AARON ASTOR, REBELS ON THE BORDER: CIVIL WAR, EMANCIPATION, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI 75–93 (2012).
69. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY 84–86 (2014); ASTOR, supra note 68, at 4–8, 230–32.
70. JOHN CUMMINGS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEGRO POPULATION: 1790–1915 57,
68 (1918).
71. Id.; TWITTY, supra note 59, at 43.
72. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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and Florida, for example, unsuccessfully sought to eliminate disfranchisement
for crime completely.73 Other efforts to curtail the reach of these laws garnered
some support but failed to pass.74 Only in South Carolina did any significant
limit on felon disfranchisement pass, with a constitutional provision reading:
“No person shall be disfranchised for felony, or other crimes committed while
such person was a slave.”75 This limited the ability of white southern Democrats to accuse formerly enslaved people of having prior offenses and denying
them the vote on that basis, something that was likely happening given this
effort to stop it.76

A. Disfranchisement in Missouri After the End of Slavery
Missouri leaders kept provisions unchanged in the 1860s. At the state’s
1865 constitutional convention, which was dominated by Republicans, disfranchisement for non-war related crimes took a back seat to larger debates about
punishing former rebels, but three proposals are of note.77 Delegate Moses P.
Green, a white man from Marion County, offered a plan that would have added
“felony” to the list of disfranchising offenses, but it did not pass.78 Delegate
Willis S. Holland, a white man from Henry County, proposed a suffrage plank
that contained perhaps the most extensive plan for disfranchising rebels or
those who aided them.79 His suffrage provision made no mention of disfranchisement for other kinds of criminals, which may have been deliberate but
also may have been an oversight due to his enthusiasm for these other provisions.80 It also specified an extensive loyalty oath.81 Delegate David Bonham,
a white man from Andrew County, proposed adding felony, larceny, and forgery to the old list and also a constitutional provision for restoration of voting
rights – a process that was provided only in statute at the time.82
The proposals by Green and Bonham would have constitutionally expanded disfranchisement to include all felonies, most notably the violent
73. OFFICIAL J. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF AL. 81–85 (1867);
J. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF FL. 19–20 (1868).
74. J. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF N.C., AT ITS SESS. 1868, at 234
(1868).
75. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 12. South Carolina’s convention had a particularly significant level of African American participation, both in number and political authority, so it is not surprising that this state went the furthest to protect African
Americans from being targeted with laws disfranchising for prior criminal convictions.
HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 9–10, 13.
76. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 33–48.
77. J. OF THE MO. STATE CONVENTION HELD AT THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, JANUARY
6–APRIL 10 (1865).
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id.
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felonies that were excluded statutorily in an echo of common law traditions.
This would have cleared up the complex – and likely unevenly enforced – situation whereby some but not all felonies were disfranchising offenses.83 Who
could remember that cutting off the ears or tongue did not result in disfranchisement but attempting to poison someone did? These proposals would have
also given the force of constitutional authority to the statutory provisions and
reclaimed some power from the legislature, as the current system ceded almost
exclusive control over disfranchisement for crime to the legislature.84 But neither one passed.85
The 1865 constitution kept the exact language of the previous constitution
with regard to disfranchisement for criminal conviction.86 But there were differences in form. Suffrage occupied its own provision in this constitution –
Article II – a change from the 1820 document.87 Article II established a registration system for the first time.88 Section 15 of Article II disfranchised and
barred from office-holding for ten years anyone “convicted of having directly
or indirectly given or offered any bribe to procure his election or appointment
to any office,” by stating that they “shall be disqualified for any office of honor
trust or profit under this State and whoever shall give or offer any bribe to
procure the election or appointment of any other person to any office shall on
conviction.”89 It also stipulated, “No person who shall make or become directly or indirectly interested in any bet or wager depending upon the result of
any election shall vote at such election.”90
Statutorily, not much changed with regard to disfranchisement of ex-offenders in Reconstruction Era Missouri.91 The only exception revolved around
the issue of betting.92 In 1871, the legislature passed an entirely revised registration statute that included a provision denying the vote to those “directly or
indirectly interested in any bet or wager depending upon the result of the election.”93
Toward the end of Reconstruction, many southern states changed their
laws to make misdemeanor larceny a disfranchising offense.94 Whereas disfranchisement was traditionally a punishment only for serious crimes, in a concerted effort to deny African Americans the vote, most southern states made
misdemeanor larceny – commonly referred to as “petit larceny” – a
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 14.
Id.
See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § 26.
Id. at art. II.
Id. at art. II, § 4.
Id. at § 15.
Id. at § 17.
MO. REV. STAT § 117.001 (1872).
Id.
Id.
HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 54–78 (2014).
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disfranchising offense.95 Though other disfranchising techniques such as literacy tests and poll taxes had the biggest overall impact on the black vote, disfranchising for misdemeanor larceny was part of a growing effort to use real
and false allegations of former criminal convictions to intimidate and disfranchise the black population.96
Missouri’s elected political leaders, unlike those in most other southern
states, did not have to change state law or the constitution in this period to
disfranchise for petit larceny. All grades of larceny resulted in disfranchisement, dating back to 1835.97 Even though the 1875 convention did not make
any changes to the constitutional provisions with regard to disfranchisement
for criminal conviction, the 1875 convention debated the issue.98 Delegates
engaged in discussions of what constituted infamous crimes, the distinction between infamous crimes and felonies, and most especially, whether petit larceny
was an infamous crime in Missouri and thus a disfranchising offense.99
Since “infamy” was defined as any crime the statute punished with denial
of suffrage and other privileges of citizenship, the constitutional provision
denying the vote to those considered infamous gave complete power to the legislature.100 Delegate H. B. Johnson, a white man and one of the convention’s
few Republicans, expressed concern that the constitution’s delegation of this
authority to the legislature could lead to a wide expansion of disfranchising
crimes:
Now the Legislature might say every man who don't go to church on
Sunday shall not vote and thereby make that an infamous crime. The
Legislature in its discretion may prohibit a man from voting, but then to
say in the Constitution that the Legislature may declare anything infamous that is giving unlimited power to the Legislature to disfranchise
anyone under the guise of multiplying offences for which a person shall
not be permitted to vote by denominating them “infamous crimes.” . . .
That amounts to giving the Legislature unlimited power to say that a
man shall not vote for any trivial thing that he may do. 101

A number of delegates seemed unclear on what “infamy” meant, engaging in lengthy discussions over the difference between felonies and infamous
crimes, common law definitions of each, whether crimes bringing disfranchisement should also produce disqualification from office-holding, and more.102
Id.
Id.
REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. III, § 62.
5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 141–
50 (Isidor Loeb & Floyd Shoemaker, eds. 1875).
99. Id. at 148–50.
100. Id. at 148.
101. Id. at 147–48.
102. Id. at 141–50.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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Delegate Thomas Tasker Gantt offered a provision: “The General Assembly
may enact laws excluding from the right of voting all persons convicted of
misdemeanors connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage or of felony.”103 This measure would have ended disfranchisement for petit larceny,
limiting the power of conservative Democrats to use this as a tool against African American voters as they had in other states.104 It is quite possible that
Gantt knew what he was doing here. Gantt was a white man and a Democrat,
but he had been a Unionist during the war, a judge advocate for General George
McClellan, and then, provost marshal general of Missouri.105 At the time of
the convention, he was the presiding judge on the St. Louis Court of Appeals.106
He certainly knew the law and was as likely as any other member of the convention to have an understanding of regional trends. Delegate Charles B.
McAfee, a Democrat and attorney, replied to Gantt’s proposal by demanding
that all infamous crimes, thus including petit larceny, be disfranchising crimes:
“If the gentleman will add to it – ‘or other infamous crimes’ so as to punish
petit larceny the same as grand larceny I will vote for his proposition.”107
A more in-depth analysis of the work of the convention and the political
affiliation of its delegates could evaluate connections between the Missouri
convention and the broader debates over disfranchisement for petit larceny that
occurred in other former slave states in this period. Were efforts by delegates
to limit disfranchisement to felony offenses done with the intention of eliminating disfranchisement for petit larceny, a practice that had been used for partisan and racial ends in other states? It is clear from the discussion – McAfee’s
reply to Gantt for example – that ensuring that individuals convicted of petit
larceny remained disfranchised was a priority for some of the members.108 This
suggests that events in other states were on their mind.

B. Regional Comparisons
Events in other states during the 1870s and 1880s revealed the racial and
partisan impact of laws disfranchising for crime. In a hotly contested 1880
103. Id. at 141.
104. Id.
105. 1 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 85 (Is-

idor Loeb & Floyd Shoemaker, eds. 1920); JOHN FLETCHER DARBY, PERSONAL
RECOLLECTIONS OF MANY PROMINENT PEOPLE WHOM I HAVE KNOWN, AND OF EVENTS
– ESPECIALLY OF THOSE RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF ST. LOUIS – DURING THE FIRST
HALF OF THE PRESENT CENTURY (1880).
106. Id.
107. 5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra
note 98, at 146; JONATHAN FAIRBANKS & CLYDE EDWIN TUCK, PAST AND PRESENT OF
GREENE COUNTY, MISSOURI (1915).
108. 5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra
note 98, at 146. Another issue debated at the convention was disfranchisement of individuals who bet on elections. Id. at 149.
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election in Florida, African American voters later testified that in the weeks
before the election, scores of black men were prosecuted for a range of small
crimes: theft of a gold button, burglary of three oranges, stealing hogs, larceny
of oats, larceny of six fish (worth twelve cents), and theft of a cowhide.109 One
of them – the man who supposedly stole the oranges – testified before Congress that such charges had become more frequent “because the election was
close on hand.”110 Another, this one an alleged hog thief, confirmed this saying, “It was a pretty general thing to convict colored men in that precinct just
before an election; they had more cases about election time than at any other
time.”111
A similar scene unfolded in Richmond, Virginia in 1888. There, on Election Day, the Democratic party stationed “challengers” – official partisan election monitors – at the city’s three predominantly African American precincts
in Jackson Ward, where they spent the day questioning voter eligibility.112
Only African American voters underwent this interrogation.113 Each time a
challenger disputed the credentials of a voter, the accusation had to be evaluated by an attendant panel of bipartisan precinct judges.114 These judges confirmed with voters their age, the spelling of their name, and their place of residence.115 The Democratic judges colluded with the Democratic challengers by
slowly and carefully verifying the information on the registration lists.116 Any
voter whose credentials were suspect had to swear an oath that he was qualified
to vote, and each was informed he faced perjury charges if a later check of his
credentials disqualified him.117
One particular kind of challenge took a disproportionate amount of time:
voters who were accused of having a prior criminal conviction. Prior to election day, the precinct judges had received lists of voters made ineligible because of criminal conviction.118 Upon each challenge, the judges combed
through the list of convicts, which contained about two thousand names,
searching for that individual’s name. Because the segregated precinct had separate lines for the two races, white voting proceeded apace while African
American voters waited for hours. Over five hundred black voters were still
109. Testimony in the Contested Election Case of Horatio Bisbee, Jr. vs. Jesse J.
Finley, from the Second Congressional District of Florida, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 11, at
414–15, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 414–19 (1881); HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 54.
110. Testimony in the Contested Election Case of Horatio Bisbee, Jr. vs. Jesse J.
Finley, from the Second Congressional District of Florida, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 11, at
414–15, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 4145 (1881).
111. Id. at 469; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 54–55.
112. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 55.
113. Id. at 143.
114. Id.
115. Pippa Holloway, “A Chicken-Stealer Shall Lose His Vote”: Disfranchisement
for Larceny in the South, 1874–1890, 75 J. OF S. HIST. 931, 951–54 (2009).
116. Id.
117. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 70–71.
118. Holloway, supra note 115, at 951–54.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/5

14

Holloway: Felon Disfranchisement in Missouri: 1821–1970

2019]

MISSOURI DISFRANCHISEMENT

989

waiting in line to vote when the polls closed. Many others had given up due to
frustration or intimidation.119

C. Racial Implications in Early Twentieth Century Missouri
The first election in Missouri in which these laws were used for racial and
partisan ends came at a St. Louis election in 1916.120 Though these laws had
long been on the books in Missouri, their use for this purpose came later than
in other former slave states likely because African Americans had not been a
significant electoral force prior to this time.121 In the early decades of the
Twentieth Century, however, black migration to the state was on the rise with
St. Louis being the primary destination for these new residents.122 In 1910, the
city was home to 43,960 African American residents; by 1920, there were
69,854.123 The electoral power of the black population was growing, and thus
so would efforts to limit it.
The 1916 presidential election was hotly contested, and many correctly
predicted that Missouri would be a key battleground.124 Democrats hoped the
state would go to Woodrow Wilson while Republicans hoped to put the state’s
electoral votes in Republican Charles Evans Hughes’s column.125 Democratic
Party operatives in the city coordinated efforts to target African American voters with stepped-up enforcement of laws disfranchising for crime.126 This election is particularly significant to the history of felon disfranchisement in Missouri. Many new African American voters had migrated to Missouri from
southern states, and the practice of disfranchising for prior criminal convictions, as well as racially motivated enforcement of these laws, followed these
black voters out of the South. Republicans, the party with which the majority
of Missouri’s black voters were affiliated, accused Democrats of “southernizing” the election, i.e. manipulating election practices, including laws disfranchising for crime, to target African Americans.127 A few weeks before the
election, Democratic leaders dispatched about twenty young attorneys to comb
the criminal court records and compile lists of African American voters who
had been convicted of crimes.128 This research produced a list of approximately

Id. at 17 (1890); HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 70–71.
HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 141.
Id. at 139–40.
KENNETH JOLLY, BLACK LIBERATION IN THE MIDWEST: THE STRUGGLE IN ST.
LOUIS, MISSOURI, 1964–1970 6 (2006).
123. Id.
124. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 141–48.
125. Id. at 141.
126. Bring the Vote Thieves to Judgment, ST. LOUIS ARGUS, at 1 (Nov. 10, 1916).
127. Id.; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 133.
128. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 141.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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three thousand names, about 25% of the registered African American voters in
the city.129
Then, the day before the election, the Democratic party took out an ad in
the newspaper warning black voters:
Democratic challengers in every affected precinct in the sixteen wards
have been given a list of the negroes who have registered illegally. AS
RAPIDLY AS THEY ARRIVE AT THE POLLS THEY WILL BE
CHALLENGED. IF THEY INSIST ON CASTING THEIR BALLOTS
AND START TO SWEAR IN THEIR VOTE, THEY WILL BE
ARRESTED AT ONCE, CHARGED WITH PERJURY.130

This was a formidable threat. African American citizens, particularly
these southern migrants, would have had longstanding experiences with violence and intimidation at the ballot box. But in contrast to southern states,
Missouri had a relatively powerful Republican party that could offer them a
modicum of support and protection.131 Concerned that this would dissuade
African American voters from casting their ballot, Republicans responded by
publishing a reassuring notice in the local African American newspaper, the St.
Louis Argus.132 They advised city residents that voters who were properly registered “need not fear any man,” and free legal counsel would be available for
those who needed it.133
Then, on Election Day, the Democrats stationed “challengers” in black
precincts.134 Accounts vary but apparently many, if not most, African American men who voted faced a challenge of their credentials based on these lists.135
Some gave up and left as soon as the challenge was issued.136 In some precincts
police officers arrested African American voters immediately after they were
challenged.137 In other instances, they waited until the judges had allowed the
individual to vote and then arrested him.138 Police escorted others out of the
polling place without arrest but prevented them from voting.139 The final count
held that police arrested ninety-six African Americans and two whites upon
allegations of trying to vote with prior disfranchising convictions.140
An important side effect of all this controversy was significant delays for
voters, particularly at precincts in African American neighborhoods. A
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 144.
Warning to Negro Voters, ST. LOUIS ARGUS, at 1 (Nov. 3, 1916).
Id.; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 142.
HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 143.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 139–50.
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Republican Party official told the press that he knew of precincts where the
wait stretched to two hours while challengers and judges interrogated the voters.141 According to another Republican leader, sixty voters waited two hours
to vote at a precinct on Laclede Avenue, but only eight were successful.142
After the election, two men, Henry Lucas and John L. Sullivan, who were
among those wrongfully disfranchised by false accusations of prior criminal
convictions, initiated civil suits against Democratic Party leaders.143 These
court cases are some of the earliest legal actions by African Americans challenging the enforcement of laws disfranchising for crime. The first to file was
Henry Lucas, a thirty-two-year-old teamster and Missouri native.144 Lucas was
arrested in the fifth precinct of the Eighth Ward following an accusation from
a white Democratic challenger, Theodore Sandman, that he had a prior grand
larceny conviction and had spent time in prison for it in 1906.145 Another disfranchised African American voter, John L. Sullivan, filed suit shortly after
Lucas.146 Sullivan claimed that when he tried to vote, a Democratic challenger
asserted that he had been convicted of petit larceny in 1896 and had served a
forty-one-day sentence in the workhouse.147 Sullivan denied all of this.148 He
said he had never been in the workhouse nor convicted nor arrested anywhere.149 He was not even living in St. Louis in 1896 – he moved there in
1910.150 While Sullivan’s suit was unsuccessful, a jury found in favor of Lucas, awarding actual damages of $250 and $50 in punitive damages.151
The success of using accusations of prior convictions to limit the African
American vote in 1916 may have fueled an effort to expand felon disfranchisement in Missouri in 1922. At the 1922 constitutional convention, many proposals were considered to restrict the vote even more.152 One proposal focused
on expanding disfranchisement for crime: a provision by delegate J.E. Cahill
that would have allowed the legislature to disfranchise for any and all crimes.153
Under Cahill’s plan anyone convicted of a felony, infamous crime, or any misdemeanor could be denied suffrage.154 Cahill’s proposal did not pass.155

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 145–50.
PROPOSALS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOURI, 1922–1923 (1922).
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
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III. TWENTIETH CENTURY: PARDONS, PAROLE, AND RESTORATION
OF RIGHTS
In the decades after 1916, the most significant legal disputes and historical
developments in Missouri regarding criminal disfranchisement revolved not so
much around which criminal offenders would lose their voting rights but by
what processes they might re-obtain them. At times, these individual efforts
formed a pattern and were either in response to or a reflection of larger social
and political changes.
In the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, many states worked
out constitutional and bureaucratic procedures by which convicted individuals
might be relieved of punishment and sanctions.156 This development owed
much to a growing adherence to legal formalism and an expanding belief that
constitutional rights could define, and often limit, the extent of government
power – what historian William Novak has called a “cult of constitutionalism”
that emerged after the Civil War.157 This combined with the push toward standardization and bureaucratization in the Progressive Era to lead states to establish formal constitutional and legal processes for restoring rights.158

A. Pardons and Gubernatorial Authority in Missouri
The first hint at the growing significance of pardons to restore citizenship
rights came at the 1875 Missouri constitutional convention.159 Delegate Benjamin F. Massey expressed concern about the broad pardon powers granted to
the governor with regard to suffrage. In the past, he observed:
A man would be pardoned the day before his term was out. Well, I
know what that was for. It was to remove his political disability; then
what becomes of those infamous crimes? If I wish to make them a disqualification for voting; and if you take hold of a man for those things,
another man steps in and wipes them all out, what remedy have you? 160

Massey’s concerns about the balance of power between the branches and
the reach of gubernatorial authority were prescient. Missouri’s constitution did
not provide for a specific act of clemency that restored voting rights but it did

156. WILLIAM NOVACK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 246–48 (1996); HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 111.
157. NOVACK, supra note 156, at 246; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 111.
158. NOVACK, supra note 156, at 246–249; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 111–12;
see also MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
159. 5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra
note 98, at 144–45.
160. Id. at 144.
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give the governor broad pardon powers.161 The Missouri legislature limited
the power of the pardon in 1879.162 Those who lost the right to vote due to a
criminal conviction could vote if pardoned, allowing pardons and restorations
for first offenses but “after a second conviction of felony or other infamous
crime, or of a misdemeanor connected with the exercise the right of suffrage,
he shall be forever excluded from voting.”163
The governor’s power to restore suffrage for first time offenders remained
unlimited in the half century to come, but a 1917 law gave the parole board the
ability to restore suffrage in some cases as well.164 Part of a major legislative
overhaul of the state prison system, a provision known as the “Three-Fourths
Rule” allowed incarcerated individuals who served their time “in an orderly
and peaceable manner” to be released after serving three fourths of their sentence.165 Moreover:
[A]t the end of five years from such discharge . . . such convict shall
thereupon be restored to all the rights of citizenship provided, that he or
she shall not have been indicted, informed against by the prosecuting or
circuit attorney, or convicted of any other crime, during such period, and
shall obtain a certificate to that effect from the Prison Pardon Board,
whose duty it shall be, upon proper showing, to issue the same and keep
a record thereof.166

This addressed a contradiction in current practice: individuals pardoned
and released had their rights restored automatically as a result of the pardon.167
But those whose good behavior warranted early release under parole did not
have this privilege – parolees had to apply for restoration of rights.168 In a
sense, individuals with good behavior were being punished more, and this revision resolved that contradiction.169

B. The Nineteenth Amendment and Pardoning Women with Felony
Convictions
Pardons soon became important to another group of Missouri residents:
female ex-offenders. Missouri was an early “partial suffrage” state, meaning
that women were allowed to vote in the 1919 presidential election before the
See MO. CONST. of 1820, art. IV, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1865, art. V, § 6.
MO. REV. STAT. § 5492 (1879) (repealed).
Id.
State Board Prison Act, 49th Legis., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1917).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Those who served their full term and were neither discharged early on parole
or pardoned were disfranchised for life unless pardoned.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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federal suffrage amendment passed.170 This may explain why two Missouri
women can be found in some of the earliest records of petitions for restorations
of voting rights. Anna Hunning, a white woman who lived in Valley Park,
sought access to the franchise with particular urgency.171 Convicted of murder
and sentenced to life in 1912, she was released on parole in 1919.172 Her parole
expired on January 1, 1921, and on January 3, she submitted a petition to Governor Frederick Gardner for restoration to citizenship.173 The petition was a
standard document printed by the state for such occasions.174 On Hunning’s
form, someone crossed out “his” and substituted “her.”175 Clearly, Missouri
was not yet prepared for petitions for restoration of citizenship from female
applicants.176
About six months later, Missouri Governor Arthur Hyde heard from Cora
Blackwell, whose race is unidentified in the pardon records.177 Blackwell was
convicted of aiding and abetting a rape in St. Louis in 1903 when she was
twenty-two years old.178 She was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary
and was released in 1907.179 In July 1921, she petitioned for a pardon so that
she could have her citizenship rights restored.180 Her petition listed her employment as a “house wife” and was signed by twenty individuals.181
Efforts by African American women with criminal convictions in Missouri to vote offer evidence of particular determination to overcome multiple
barriers to suffrage. In 1932, an African American woman named Annie Tassin contacted the Missouri governor to request restoration of her citizenship.182
According to the form Tassin submitted, she had been convicted of “burglar
[sic] in second degree.”183 For date of conviction she wrote, “Can’t remember
exactly.”184 Her enclosed petition was endorsed by ten female signatories
along with fourteen men.185 Still, the state’s petition form had not changed.186
Tassin crossed out the “his” and changed it to “her.”187
170. HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE: 1900–1920 (Ida Husted Harper, ed. 1922);
Holloway, supra note 45, at 196.
171. Holloway, supra note 45, at 196.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 197.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Tassin wrote a letter to the governor to accompany her petition, and in it,
she suggested an additional reason to have her citizenship restored.188 She explained that she would “love to have [her] citizenship back, for it means so
much to [her] in [her] life to live.”189 Why was it so important? For one, she
“want[ed] to live a true life.”190 In addition, she told the governor that she
sought a pardon because she was “identified by so many organizations.”191
Tassin’s comments indicate that being disfranchised for a prior criminal conviction affected her social status in the community.192 Organizations she had
joined – likely women’s clubs and benevolent organizations – must have
frowned on her criminal past, and so she sought to have her record cleared as
much as possible.193
Another African American female voter, Mary Cole, who lived in Jefferson City, sought restoration of her citizenship rights in 1930.194 Mary Cole’s
petition was accompanied by a letter to the governor from the prosecuting attorney in the county – a white man named Otto Ankersheil.195 Ankersheil
wrote that Cole and her husband were “old colored people who came into this
county from Arkansas and had not been in the state but about nine months.”196
Ankersheil explained that a candidate for a local election had sought their vote
and drove them to the polling place, where they voted.197 Because they were
recent migrants and not eligible to vote, they were arrested.198 Ankersheil concluded, “In my opinion it was purely a matter of ignorance on the part of these
old darkies being persuaded to vote by a white man in whom they put confidence and there was no intention on their part to violate the law.”199
Shifting the lens to Cole and her husband’s perspective changes the story
drastically. Here is another version of the tale: as soon as they got out of Arkansas, leaving behind a state where white southern Democrats denied them
suffrage, the Coles were so determined to vote that they convinced a white
politician to drive them to the polling place.200 Then, charged with being ineligible to vote, they blamed their crime on the white politician and chauffeur
and sought the restoration of their citizenship rights, gathering signatures and
securing the sympathy and support of the local prosecutor.201 With her

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197–98.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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citizenship now restored, Cole could again participate in an election.202 One
suspects that within the year she did exactly that.203

CONCLUSION: STATE EX REL. OLIVER V. HUNT AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF DISFRANCHISEMENT IN MISSOURI
The Missouri statute that allowed restoration of voting rights five years
after discharge under the Three Fourths Rule was challenged in 1952 in State
ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt.204 At issue was whether the legislation automatically
restoring suffrage rights under the parole law undermined the governor’s authority to pardon.205 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the legislature
could restore voting rights to individuals in such circumstances and that extending this power to the legislature did not limit gubernatorial power.206
Moreover, the court made an interesting argument justifying the distinction between the parole law’s restoration of rights and a gubernatorial pardon.207 Pardons were acts of mercy and a “derogation of law.”208 In contrast, the parole
law was rehabilitative.209
In deciding State ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt, the court took the opportunity to make
an argument in favor of restoration of rights for those released from incarceration:
Prior to the enactment of the parole law in 1897, all persons, no matter
how extenuating the circumstances, were upon conviction forced to undergo the punishment fixed by statute. After undergoing the stigma and
degradation of imprisonment, they far too often became vicious repeaters. Following the enactment of this law, tens of thousands of men,
given the supervision and encouragement of its provisions, have been
restored to good citizenship. Thousands of these men, who, but for the
very statute here sought to be declared unconstitutional, would be
branded as felons, unworthy of the right of franchise, unworthy to serve
as jurors or to hold positions of honor or trust, are today exercising those
rights with honor to themselves and this State. These privileges ought
not be taken from them, nor should future transgressors be denied the
incentive of reformation that Section 549.170 has so successfully

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
247 S.W.2d 969 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
Id. at 970.
Id. at 973.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inspired in others since its enactment, unless there is impelling reason
for so doing. Society would not profit thereby. 210

These conflicting perspectives on incarceration – whether it is intended
for retribution or rehabilitation – have shaped discussions of the restoration of
voting rights for ex-felons throughout American history. The court’s reference
to “degradation” evokes the long history of infamy and the social and political
stigma attached to infamous punishments.211 In contrast, those who voted were
doing so “with honor,” an indication that for these individuals the mark of infamy was now gone.212 The court saw a private good in the restoration of their
rights, to the extent that these individuals now received more respect, but also
a public good because restoration of rights incentivized reform.213
Finally, the court underscored the powerful role that Missouri’s legislature has in determining the voting rights of ex-felons. The opinion notes, “This
clause vests wide discretion in the legislature to determine the extent to which
persons convicted of felony may be excluded from the right of suffrage.”214
The history of felon disfranchisement in Missouri bears this out. At times the
Missouri legislature has chosen to impose broad, life-long disfranchisement
and at other times it has chosen to limit it. At times the power to restore citizenship has been exclusively the governor’s and at other times the legislature
has appropriated this power as well.
As it has since statehood, Missouri’s present constitution offers the legislature the ability to exclude felons from voting but does not require it. There
is no constitutional requirement to extend disfranchisement through probation
and parole. Many other states have recently changed their laws so that voting
rights are restored after release from incarceration.215 The Missouri legislature
could act at any time to restore voting rights at the time of release from prison.
There is no constitutional mandate for disfranchisement during incarceration
in Missouri either. Arguments for expanding access to the franchise for exfelons and even those who are currently incarcerated can be grounded in an
understanding of both the continuity of these laws and the changes in them over
the scope of Missouri’s history.

Id. at 972.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 973.
Morgan McLeod, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades of Felony Disenfranchisement Reforms, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 17, 2018) https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/expanding-vote-two-decades-felony-disenfranchisement-reforms/ [perma.cc/BFZ5-FM5H].
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